LIDAM Events

Conférence annuelle en mémoire de Jacques Drèze organisée conjointement par le Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE, LIDAM), l'Ecole d'économie (ESL) et l'Association des économistes de Louvain (ADEL).

Cette année, la conférence sera donnée par Jean Drèze, avec pour thème
L'emploi garanti en action : l'expérience indienne

Jean Drèze, économiste du développement, est actuellement professeur invité à l'université de Ranchi en Inde et professeur honoraire à la Delhi School of Economics.
Il a apporté de nombreuses contributions à l'économie du développement et aux politiques publiques, en particulier concernant l'Inde. Parmi ses ouvrages récents, citons An Uncertain Glory :
India and Its Contradictions (avec Amartya Sen) et Sense and Solidarity : Jholawala Economics for Everyone. Jean Drèze est également actif dans diverses campagnes en faveur des droits économiques et sociaux.
Son travail a contribué à l'élaboration de plusieurs législations sociales importantes en Inde, notamment la loi nationale sur la garantie de l'emploi rural (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act).

La conférence aura lieu le jeudi 19 décembre 2024 à Louvain-la-Neuve, au Foyer royal (Aula Magna) à 18 heures.
Deux membres de l'UCLouvain interviendront dans la foulée de sa présentation:

• Bruno van der Linden de l'IRES, UCLouvain
• Philippe van Parijs de la Chaire Hoover d'éthique économique et sociale, UCLouvain

Un drink sera proposé à 20h.

Etant donné que le nombre de personnes qui peuvent assister à la conférence est limité, l'inscription est gratuite mais obligatoire.
Pour vous inscire à cette conférence et/ou au drink, merci de compléter le lien suivant avant le 6 décembre 2024:

https://forms.office.com/e/SpmeKKmTk2

Daniele Catanzaro, Président du CORE,
William Pariente, Président de l'ESL,
Bernard Fierens Gevaert, Président de l'ADEL.

Lors de cette conférence, des photos et vidéos seront prises et utilisées sur le site internet. Si vous ne souhaitez pas apparaitre sur ces photos; merci d'envoyer un message à lidam.com@uclouvain.be

Hugo Gilbert (Université Paris Dauphine).
Invited by Daniele Catanzaro

will give a presentation on :

On the Computation of Strategyproof and Fair Picking Sequences

Abstract : 

When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships (also known as non-interleaving picking sequences): given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated agent chooses a given number of items (depending on her position in the sequence). With these rules, agents who come earlier in the sequence have a larger choice of items. However, this advantage can be compensated by a higher number of items received by those who come later. How to balance priority in the sequence and number of items received is a nontrivial question. 
In this presentation, we use a model parameterized by a mapping from ranks to scores, a social welfare functional, and a distribution over preference profiles. For several meaningful choices of parameters, we show that an optimal sequence can be computed exactly in polynomial time or approximated by resorting to sampling.  

Joint work with Sylvain Bouveret, Jérôme Lang, and Guillaume Méroué.

  Hugo Gilbert

Emiliano Lancini (Université Paris Dauphine).
Invited by Daniele Catanzaro

will give a presentation on :

Sequential picking games against greedy on Matroids

Abstract : 

Given a hypergraph on a set of n ordered vertices, we define an independent set X to be feasible, if X is a possible outcome for a player in a sequential picking game, against a greedyadversary, where no hyperedge can be contained in the union of both outcomes. We prove that testing feasibilty is NP-complete, even if the hypergaph is a graph, but it becomes polynomial for matroid hypergraphs, that is, when the hyperedges are the circuits of some matroid. We prove that optimizing a linear function over feasible sets is NP-hard for matroid hypergraphs, even for graphic matroids, but it becomes polynomial for laminar matroids.

  Emiliano Lancini

Ibrahim Abada (Grenoble Ecole de Management).
Invited by Daniele Catanzaro

will give a presentation on :

Risk-sharing in Energy Communities

Abstract : 

Energy communities are considered one of the pillars of the energy transition, owing to the rapid development of digital smart appliances and metering. They benefit from strong political support to accommodate their penetration in Europe. Nevertheless, the pace at which they have developed has been very slow compared with what was expected a decade ago. Many articles have revealed some of the underlying reasons, among which are social heterogeneity among participants, unfavorable local regulations, and inadequate governance. Most recently, a nascent body of research has highlighted the need to find adequate sharing rules for the benefits of community projects. Because of the complexity of these rules, the appointment of a community manager or coordinator may be necessary. This paper follows suit by providing guidance to policy makers or community managers about optimal risk-sharing schemes among members of an energy community. By modeling and simulating energy communities that invest in a rooftop photo-voltaic project and face some degree of production and remuneration risk, we find that a high level of risk aversion makes it impossible to allocate the risk in a stable way. Furthermore, we show that some communities whose members' risk aversion is too heterogeneous cannot form successfully. Besides, even when risk can be allocated in a stable manner, we show that fair allocations are so complex that they require the intervention of a coordinator or a community manager. Finally, we analyze the advantages of developing judicious risk-sharing instruments between communities and a central entity for providing stability.

  Ibrahim Abada

Michele Modugno (Federal Reserve Bank)
Invited by Prof. Leonardo Iania

will give a presentation on :

Decoding Equity Market Reactions to Macroeconomic News

Abstract : 

We show that the reaction of the equity market to macroeconomic news is rationalized by their propagation into the real economy. We embody all the macro news in an activity and a price news indexes that together explain 34% of the quarterly stock price returns variation. When those indexes capture a stream of favorable macroeconomic surprises, publicly traded firms experience increases in revenues, profitability, financing, and investment activities. This firm-level result culminates in an expansion of the real side of the whole US economy. These results, taken together, show that the expectation of the realization of firms growth is the main driver of the stock prices reaction to macro news.

  Michele Modugno

Matteo Bulgarelli (CORE)

will give a presentation on :

Leasing, Bundling and Aggregate Output: Are Rental Subscriptions Sustainable?

Abstract : 

We study the potential of rental subscriptions as a tool to abate the production impact. We build an oligopoly model where two single-product retailers and a multi-product rental provider compete on prices: products in our model are horizontally differentiated, while leasing is qualitatively inferior to owning an item. The rental provider, or Access Based Service Provider (ABSP) offers a bundle of two products, and its user base receives one product per period. We compare the equilibrium outcomes with a setup where the multi-product firm sells the two products, rather than renting them out. We show that leasing is greener than selling for goods characterized by small unit cost: moreover, a marginal improvement on the ability of the ABSP to serve multiple consumers with the same item does not necessarily result in a lower production impact, due to the strategic response of the competitors. Finally, we find that as leasing and selling become closer substitutes, leasing is more likely to result in higher production impact, in that the cost savings implied by better asset utilisation translate into a very large user base for the multi-product firm.

  Matteo Bulgarelli

Yin Dai

(Aarhus University)

will give a presentation on

Quality Complementarity of Imported Inputs and Output Quality

Andreas Madestam

(Stockholm University)

will give a presentation on

Credit Contracts, Business Development and Gender: Evidence from Uganda

Abstract: We examine how liquidity shortages at various stages of the loan cycle affect small firm growth and vary by entrepreneurs' gender. Providing liquidity—whether upfront for larger initial investments, early to manage costs and repayments when returns are delayed, or throughout to cushion financial shocks—can improve business outcomes, though social pressures to share funds may limit effective liquidity management. In a field experiment with a major Ugandan lender, entrepreneurs were randomly assigned to different repayment plans, varying the timing of liquidity access. Results indicate that the timing of liquidity provision is crucial: profits are significantly higher after five years when liquidity is available throughout the loan cycle, with the optimal timing depending on entrepreneur gender. By contrast, upfront liquidity shows no impact on firm outcomes. Male-owned businesses see increased hiring and higher profits when liquidity is available across the cycle, while female-owned businesses benefit more from early liquidity. We present suggestive evidence that these differences are driven by kinship taxation on female entrepreneurs.

Daniel Gottlieb

(London School of Economics)

will give a presentation on

Market Power and Insurance Coverage

Abstract:This paper examines how market power affects coverage in a general class of insurance models. We show that market power decreases coverage for individuals who are less willing to pay for insurance but increases coverage for those with a higher willingness to pay. Under weak conditions, a monopolist always excludes a positive mass of customers, whereas competitive firms do not. However, to avoid cream skimming, competitive firms provide less coverage than a monopolist for consumers who are willing to pay more. The welfare comparison between competitive and monopolistic markets depends on whether the distortion at the bottom (higher under monopoly) exceeds the distortion at the top (higher under competition). Using simulations based on an empirical model of preferences, we find that both effects are quantitatively important although the effect at the bottom dominates. So, in our calibrated model, the market power distortion exceeds the cream skimming distortion from competition.

Leander Heldring

(Northwestern University)

will give a presentation on

TBA

Abstract: