12h45 - 14h  
D.041 Bâtiment Dupriez  

Mardi intime de la Chaire Hoover par Tamaz Tokhadze

Radical Permissivism holds that, in almost all evidential situations, a wide range of credences towards a proposition can be equally rational.  This view allows for the rational permissibility of beliefs that intuitively seem highly irrational – such as Clifford’s shipowner believing his ship is seaworthy despite lack of evidence or a conspiracy theorist believing in the dangers of childhood vaccination. These beliefs, in turn, can justify actions with serious moral consequences, assuming a widely held connection between epistemic rationality and moral permissibility. In this paper, I argue that Radical Permissivism cannot adequately account for the connection between epistemic rationality and the moral permissibility of actions. I further show that Pettigrew’s (2022) proposed strategy for addressing this problem is lacking. I conclude that a more moderate epistemology is needed to preserve a plausible link between rational belief and moral responsibility.